The (New) Product Team’s success is dependent on getting those two groups ( The Customer and Rest of Company) to interact so well, that you can let go, and let the product take on “a life of its own.” Your goal is to do such a great job at connecting that, in the end, you need to do “Nothing” Connect – Part 7 – What the !@#$ Does Marketing Do?.
Sadly … Still very relevant. Here is some “burnout slideware” on the topic.
Full Text of “I Forget What 8 Was For? – What the !@#$ Does Marketing Do?”
I’d like to forget that I’ve experienced the following “pre-cursors to burnout” events too many times in the competitive technology industry.
Getting dizzy spells during a meeting.
Watching a colleague fall asleep during the weekly update.
Watching a customer fall asleep during a meeting.
Forgetting a close colleagues name.
Forgetting a bosses name.
Forgetting how I got to this meeting room.
Getting dizzy spells on the drive home.
Not being able to get out of bed for 2-3 days after a big conference.
These events are a way of life, they happen all the time. The unwritten rule of thumb is “Just play thru the pain like pro athletes” do. But in my reality the tech industry is “burnout central”. I see it too often. We forget that Pro Athletes don’t play everyday and the ones who have long careers take care of themselves very well.
Anedotal Evidence ( tech is a high risk environment ) — I know a handful of burnout victims whose symptoms were so serious that they had to make significant career changes. Most of them were marketers, none were VP and above. Not a large number, but depending on how I count, this is anywhere from 20 to 50% of some job categories. Note that these percentages include only the ones who have confided in me. Few people like to advertise that they can’t cut it anymore.
It is interesting that most statistics that I’ve read talk about this executive (VP+) dividing line as well. The most common explanation is that executives spend a lot more time reviewing the the “pros & cons” of projects, they have a lot more information, they are usually the first to “buy in” to programs, they are on the hook to “sell the program” downstream, and generally have more control of their environment. This does make some sense, but I’m still not sure about this explanation.
Being a “poster child” for burn-out has also put me in a position to constantly hear anecdotal comments from friends and colleagues all over the industry. I hear the following phrase too often, “there is sooo much of what you have in the valley”. These numbers are the same everywhere. I’m guessing that every tech worker has had a few scares along the way.
It’s Not Gonna Happen to Me ( wrong ) — I’m not saying that everyone should go out an quit their job now. I’m saying that you’ve got to be aware that you work in a high risk environment. You’ve got look at the example of Pro Athletes — take care of yourself if you want a long career. If you start having symptoms act on them quickly. Don’t let them slide. Better yet — be proactive.
It’s good to know how you react to stress, so that you can act on it. This is difficult, not everyone reacts to stress in the same way. Some people develop more physical ailments like rashes, back pain, numbness, etc. Another indicator is how you make decisions. Most managers take a test to see how they make decisions under stress. I forget the name, but its the one where the results are plotted on “triangle graph” – blue in top left, red in top right, and green on the bottom. You mark the point where you are with little stress and the point where you are under lots of stress. The “vector” then describes you under stress.
If you have a “long vector” it is relatively simple for you, and others, to determine when you’re are under stress. Unfortunately for me I am one of those people whose dots sit on top of one another — The Hub guy — I’m an ice man — no difference between stress and no stress. The good news — I play great under pressure — the bad news — this group is the most susceptible to burnout.
It’s Ok … Burn Out doesn’t last forever ( wrong ) — Unlike a cut or a broken bone, burnout often doesn’t heal well. It usually leaves a permanent “scar”. In my case I have effects that are analogous to a person who has had multiple concussions. My “concussions” are brought on by a combination of stress and situations which require me to follow multiple “threads” of conversation/thinking. In computer lingo I don’t “task switch” well ( if at all ). If I get myself into a situation where “task switching” is key — like a meeting or party I’ll slowly begin having difficulty following the conversation. If I stick with it I’ll soon begin having “concussion” like symptoms — starts with ringing in the head & can get as severe as near blackout.
In daily life this is confusing for most people I interact with because I look normal. In fact most people note — you look great. This is likely to be true since I’m down to university level clothing sizes. But just like a “Lindros or Lafontaine”, whose pro hockey careers ended due to concussions, I look like I can play. I want to play. But if I do play, I’m putting my long term health in jeopardy every time that I step on the playing surface I have effects every meeting ( social or work ) that I attend. It never goes away.
Movin On – I put the Daedalus and Icarus picture above because it describes how I feel when I’m working with others these days. I have plenty of experience which can help people to fly. But this knowledge also allows them to fly too close to the sun. Just like I did
In 1976 Aravind opened in Madurai, India, with 11 beds and a mission to eliminate “curable blindness”. In 1981 they did 10,000 surgeries. In 2009 they did 300,000! In the process they developed their own rural out-reach programs, cataract surgery processes, started a company (Aurolab) to build lenses, started a training program LAICO for third and first world training. Just wow!
The high volume is because they do “free” and “less than” free surgeries as well as paid. Chapter 2 is “When Free is Not Enough”. For their poorest patients they need to do more than just pay for the surgery. Aravind’s fee structure for 2010 (page 289 ) was
Free 27%
Minimal Payment 26%
Regular & Premium Payment 47%
10x More Cataract Surgeries per Doctor per Year
The most amazing statistic is Average Number of Cataract Surgeries per eye surgeon per Year. It’s 10x the developed world! (page 291) And the complication rate is equal or lower! (page 292)
Aravind 2,000
USA less than 200
More Links
So amazing that there has been an HBR case available since 1993.
This is not an easy read, so I find it hard to make it a must read. That said there are so many good ideas that are well developed and explained thoroughly. If you’re into innovation then this is a must read. I really like how much time Buxton spends relating and positioning design with respect to the other disciplines like marketing and engineering. The whole concept of sketching vs. prototyping took a while to sink in for me. I’m hoping to write more on this book. It has a good history of the iPod in it too.
Diagramming Innovation – Explore & Refine
I find that most people “want to believe” that innovation is “incremental refinement” and that some people “want to believe” that innovation is a “grand exploration”. Buxton provides to two very simple diagrams to convey these themes on page 388. I think innovation requires both. I think that is why I like Steve Blanks Customer Development Model with it’s Search (Explore) and Execute (Refine) phases.
Refine
Figure 149 Prototyping as Iterative Incremental Refinement
Explore
Figure 150 Design as Branching Exploration and Comparison
The red lines
In fig 150 the RED Line is to emphasize how many branches were being explored at that given time in the process. … The branches in Fig 150 are intended to represent the various alternatives that were explored in the process of arriving at the end design, which is represented by the branch at the extreme right. This is where the RED ARROW in Figure 149 begins. Buxton page 387
Way back in November 2012 I attempted to capture the key points of the HP Kittyhawk Case « Clayton M. Christensen through the “lens” of Steve Blank’s “Market Type” and “Customer Discovery”. /enjoy.
There are no facts inside your building, so get outside
Test your hypotheses
Two are fundamental: problem and product concept
{ Use Minimum Viable Product (MVP) for product exploration }
Rules
Facts are outside the building, opinions are inside.
Solve a problem that customers say is important and valuable
Does the product concept solve that problem?
Exit Criteria
What are your customers top problems?
How much will they pay to solve them
Does your product concept solve them?
Do customers agree?
How much will they pay
Can you draw a day-in-the-life of a customer
before & after your product
Can you draw the org chart of users & buyers
Discussion / Conclusions
The “Kittyhawk Team” did not do Customer Discovery as described in “Start up Owners Manual. That is they did not employ “Minimum Viable Product” (MVP) strategies to rapidly research, and explore, “Product/Market Fit” with end-customers. They developed a “full” product in house and launched it without “experimenting” on their customers prior to launch. They made one decision, PDA vs. Nintendo in June ’91. They operated as if they were delivering an “enormously better” product into an existing market that understood, and needed, that improvement. They may have had lots of “hypotheses” along the way, but tested none of them over the 3+ year span of this case. For example, “Did they revisit the exploration of a $50 drive from a technical perspective after ’91?”, “If Cheap-Dumb-Drives were so important why didn’t they have a technical team working that angle to find the breakthrough?, “Why did it take until ’93/’94 to explore ‘marketing cost reductions’, like asking Nintendo about the accelerometer?”. What exactly did they explore over that time period? It was “How to sell what they already had”, no changes please.
The “Kittyhawk Team” did Customer Discovery the “old way”. They met over lunch in early 1991 and the “boss” selected the product. A few months later the Kittyhawk Team researches team dynamics and hires a “Can Do” core team ( ie people who can execute). They ensured that “marketing” would stick to the executive plan by hiring an inexperienced MBA, Jeff White, who had little hope of effecting change to the plan. In May they develop a charter that is all “execution”, there is no room for exploration or failure. In June 1991, about 5 months after the boss selected the product, they go to CES to talk to potential customers for the FIRST time. They decide on the mobile PDA market because Nintendo’s request is not technically feasible at that time. They then hire a market research firm to look at PDAs ( while HP are developing the product), but that firm can not “size” the PDA market or determine the leading customer targets. This is not a “RED FLAG” to the team. They stick to the schedule and deliver on time in June 1992. Even with the product in production they refuse to explore the markets that new customers bring to them. HP Kittyhawk then develops a refined version, the Kittyhawk II, for this same PDA market. The case leads us to believe that HP Kittyhawk marketing never discussed the cost of the accelerometer with Nintendo until after the Kittyhawk II ( so somewhere in 1993 to 1994) . In 1994, 3 years later, they are finally deciding if they should explore a new market for their drive. It’s the “PDAs are the market” or that “cheap dumb drive” market the “new” customers are asking about. In those 3 years they’ve never learned much, they just executed and delivered to schedule.
HP KittyHawk Case Timeline
The “Kittyhawk Team” set product milestones as if they were delivering a “better/faster” product into an existing market even though they knew that PDAs were an emerging and unproven market. They did internal market research and launched. They did not believe that market adoption of their product would be an issue. They did not foresee any “chasms”. Even more astounding is that the “Kittyhawk Team” expected the Consumer Market Drive eco-system to operate in similar way to the “Enterprise Market” Drive eco-system that they were a leader in. Thus they began a “Customer Discovery” process only as “Triage”, or damage control, after having trouble selling the “Kittyhawk” drive for 3 years. Thus all of their “Customer Discovery” activity really happened with the “Kittyhawk” and “Kittyhawk II”. Sadly it was a very expensive MVP. Given that they spent an enormous amount of money on Kittyhawk with minimal return they ran out of the corporate goodwill required to experiment further and jeopardized the development of Enterprise Drives. HP DMD would close its doors in a few years time.
So What? (What Could You Have Done in Jeff White’s Place?)
You finished your MBA and got a great job at HP a few months ago. But now you’ve slaved for a few months and figured out that HP.DMD.Sales has no “lead customer” for the PDA market. Not one. In fact they don’t even know who the short list of prospects should be! You’ve figured out that there was no PDA market study, “The big boss” picked the “smallest box” on his desk over lunch. The “big guys” went to CES for a week, are now PDA experts, and made a decision. The project creed was cool at first, “I am going to build a small, dumb, cheap disk drive!”, but it’s now clear the creed is missing a key part, “For Who?” There are markets who would like a “cheap” drive, but HP.DMD doesn’t know those markets and engineering now says that we need a significant breath-through to get there. It’s starting to look like you’ve been placed on the “Titanic”. What can you do? You’re the marketing guy? What could you do now that you have taken this course?
The first thing you could have done is to have a “Customer Discovery Review” meeting in June 1991 prior to launching full product development. At that meeting you could review the “Customer Discovery Exit Criteria. You would present the concept of Market Type, the Business Model Canvases, the “Day in the Life of the Customers”, and org charts of your customers. From this it should be apparent that HPs plan was very weak. A reasonable outcome could have been.
“Delay full development for one month to find a lead customer and take a better look at the Nintendo opportunity”. Actions could be
a) Hire Market Research Firm to identify prospective lead customers in PDA industry
b) Allocate small amount of resources for “Customer Discovery” of cheap drive segment, Nintendo, on marketing and technical levels.
The outcome would most likely be “we’re not stopping, but we’ll do some of that work.” In the hallway expect that you’ll be told – But remember young man we need you to get out and support the sales team with Kittyhawk.PDA. Don’t be afraid, we know what we’re doing. It’s not as bleak as you say.
The second opportunity for you to speak up is after a month into the Market Research work. This is a serious event, a team of people who really know how to do the research couldn’t develop a list of lead prospects! This is a huge red flag. If you can’t force a Customer Discovery Review with this information then you are certainly on the “Titanic”. Thus you get the review scheduled. Now you are calm and you do a “Customer Discovery Exit” Review. At this point you recommend that “HP Kittyhawk.PDA” be delayed until lead prospects can be determined. Make the HP.Kittyhawk supporters work hard for their dream. Hey it might work if you put up a “challenge”. You then note progress on the “Kittyhawk.Nintendo” “skunk works”. The results of the Nintendo trip resulted in information that “accelerometer” is not needed and there are many other places where costs can be cut. The specifications for the Kittyhawk.Nintendo drive are becoming more realistic, but more R&D is still needed for the breakthrough. The Nintendo guys also hinted that other consumer devices may need this and they dropped some names we can follow up on.
The outcome of this meeting will not be pretty. It is likely that people will be fired. Possibly you for bringing this up. But most likely you will survive and your “tough spirit” will be rewarded for thinking more of the team than yourself.
If the decision after this is to plow ahead with no changes then you need to make a serious career choice.
More – Customer Development Manifesto and 9 Deadly Sins
The HP Kittyhawk Team was very close to the “story” told in “Startup Owner’s Manual – Chapter 1 – The Path to Disaster: A Startup Is Not a Small Version of a Big Company” and it committed many of the “9 Deadly Sins” mentioned in this chapter. It’s actions are inconsistent with the Startup Manifesto.
Market Type
Kittyhawk – New. New. New. (New Technology & New Product Markets & New Customer Types.)
New Technology
New leading Parameters in Physical Size and Capacity
New Product Markets
None of the markets discussed were in volume production at that time.
Each had not “Crossed the Chasm”
New Customer Types
HP DMD is totally new to Consumer Market Space.
It does not participate in Consumer Market and thus does not have working experience with how to develop products or communicate in this segment.
Business Model Canvases – Existing Drive & New Drive Kittyhawk
HP Server/Workstation vs Kittyhawk Canvases Compared
Existing
Value Proposition
Fastest Access Times
Highest Capacity
Feature Driven
High Price
Customer Segments
Workstation/Server Drive OEMs 80% & HP itself 20%
It has a internal customer who was/is a market leader in this segment.
The archetype is someone who is very similar to HP DMD. HP DMD and their customers are aligned in their belief of what constitutes a Workstation/Server Product.
Channels
not really mentioned. but one that is high-end existing feature driven B2B.
Likely direct sales.
Customer Relationships
Many years of delivering technically leading edge products.
Reference Selling and communication of past performance for it’s target segment.
Kittyhawk
Value Proposition
Guess – Industry "leap-frog” “size&capacity” with “3-foot drop”
Small
Dumb
Cheap
“droppable”
Customer Segments
All of them are a “Guess” because none have “Crossed the Chasm”
There are few (if any) internal “HP” customers to help drive the product. They have no “close friends” in the consumer space to “collaborate” with or whom they trust.
A TAM/SAM would show that revenue from all these products in best case is 3 Years out and will likely require a few iterations ( Think iPod .. It hit volume with the 4th Generation Model http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ipod_sales_per_quarter.svg )
There is no existing market product space for the kittyhawk to enter. ( Thus the targets set can not be met. Period. )
Customer Archetype
Almost the exact opposite of HP DMD. “HP DMD did see that they needed to build a Cheap Drive”, “I am going to build a small, dumb, cheap disk drive!” – But they didn’t know “who” was going to use it.
Thus their archetype “DID NOT HAVE A PERSON IN IT” This is a “RED FLAG”
Channels
Guess – different than one needed for “Workstation/Server”
Customer Relationships
All less than 1 year. Often first time they have met.
No experience with “consumer” market segment.
Revenue
sell drive unit (asset sale)
HBR Teaching Notes
Primary Learning Objectives
Students should be able to extract four important lessons from a well-crafted class discussion of the Kittyhawk project.
1. First, in commercializing a disruptive technology such as the Kittyhawk, manufacturers are faced with a fundamental strategic choice. One option is to accept the market’s needs as well-defined, and push the technology of the product to its limit to address the needs of established market. An alternative option is to accept the technology’s current capabilities as given, and then seek a market that will value the inherent attributes of that technology. Research has shown that although most winners in disruptive technological innovation pursue the latter route, the vast majority of established firms opt instinctively for the former (see Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma ) Iain – Most firms instinctively chase an “Existing Market” instead of looking for “Product/Market Fit”.
2. The second learning objective is to understand that customer input can be extremely misleading in an emerging market environment. Other methods of market research, which involve inexpensive explorators marketing of preliminary product designs in order to create knowledge about the market, can be much more reliable in synthesizing customer’s opinions. The concept of Minimum Viable Product as Customer Discovery tool. The Kittyhawk was a very expensive MVP
3. When searching for a new market for a new technology, it is always important for a team to assess not just the probability that it’s own technology may or may not succeed, but also to take into account the risk that additional technologies which are critical for the ultimate end-use application, might not work. In situations such as this, the total probability of failure is the product of the probabilities of failure of each element of technology being developed for the application. Each customer product market has to Cross The Chasm too
4. When a new technology fosters the development of a new market, an incubation period often exists through which potential customers need to work in order to understand how they might incorporate this new possibility. It is often difficult to shortcut this incubation period, corporate mandates of short payback periods notwithstanding. New Market Chasms are much larger than one wants. One can’t force it. Again look at length of time MP3 players took to become volume products
Tibet: An Inner Journey by Matthieu Ricard is not a challenging book. It is just an amazing set of pictures and brief histories of spiritual places in Tibet.
The one thing that comes to mind is “time warp”. It’s like going back in time – horses, hand printing, etc.
I’ve also reviewed his book “Happiness” It is a more challenging read.
“Ideas are the easy part … delivering on an idea is the hard part. It’s a long hard journey – from imagination to impact” is the theme of the “HowTo Innovate Book” The Other Side of Innovation: Solving the Execution Challenge « Vijay Govindarajan, Chris Trimble To the books authors, VG & Trimble, Thank You for that. I’ve always found that delivering on an innovation is extremely challenging. Reading through this book was like poring salt in old wounds. It reminded me of all the screw-ups I’ve made and introduced me to many more. My first reaction has been to recommend this book to anyone I come in contact to. It is that good.
I really like how they position an Innovation Team within an existing business. It’s a partnership. They dig into the issues of the “relationship” between Innovation Teams and Corporate Staff. They talk about hiring outside employees. Why and Why not. They dig into Power Balance and Status Issues. They cover most of the “conventional” wisdom and either confirm or debunk it. Fantastic.
The second section of the book is “HowTo Run an Innovation Experiment”. I really like the implications of that title. It is enough to ruffle a few feathers. That is “Innovations are Experiments … they are not guaranteed, we’re doing this test because … we don’t know how to do it”. They introduce very good concepts and provide a few tools.
How Does It Fit With Steve Blank’s Leanlaunch Pad and Customer Development?
I’m a Steve Blank fan-boy and didn’t need another book on innovation, but I did find it on his blogs’ short-list of books to read. I was curious since he hasn’t added many books to the shortlist in a long time.
My first pass is that VG & Trimble are very synergistic with Steve Blank’s Customer Development and Leanlaunch Pad. They are Yin & Yang. The complementary nature is in the style of delivery and where they come from. VG & Trimble choose a more time honoured business school justification of “Innovation as an Experiment” via collecting a ton of data and synthesizing it. They provide a very good “wrapper” for understanding “Innovation as an Experiment”. This is in contrast to Steve Blank’s “Gonzo/Manifesto” style that “practitioners” prefer. That said everyone has to read both, especially your “evil twin”, if you’re a practitioner then you have to read VG & Trimble no matter how much you don’t want to, and vice-versa. In a nutshell, VG & Trimble’s data seems to validate the LLP “Innovation as Experiment” approach. They are friend.
The high-level stuff. VG & Trimble provide a high-level framework for innovation within an existing business – Intrapreneurship. They provide a solid justification for spending time on “The Team” and “The Experiment”. VG & Trimble are much more focussed on Intrapreneurs and that means that they have some amazing points on “relationships” between the Core Business and the Innovation Team. A lot of these relationship issues are similar to those between Investors and Startups, but many are very different. If you’re an Intrapreneur you really need to read the “The Team” section. It will make a difference.
The main differences are about depth & details in “The Experiment” section. Here I would say that VG & Trimble do a great job laying out the problem to be solved. They provide useful tools and processes. If you’re doing this for real right now, then you need that mental support right now. And if your “Experiment” requires you to get customers for your product then you’d better dig into The Leanlaunch Pad (LLP) process via the Startup Owner’s Manual for more detail provided by a “practitioner”.
RT @nikhilgoya_l: "The biggest mistake you can make is listening to people who've given up on their dreams telling you to give up on yours.… 3 days ago
Posted by Iain Verigin 
Serious Stuff – The Burnout Zone
April 12, 2013I wrote this “popular” post on “burnout” way back in 1Q2007. I Forget What 8 Was For? – What the !@#$ Does Marketing Do? I was amazed how many people spoke to me about it back then.
Sadly … Still very relevant. Here is some “burnout slideware” on the topic.
Full Text of “I Forget What 8 Was For? – What the !@#$ Does Marketing Do?”
I’d like to forget that I’ve experienced the following “pre-cursors to burnout” events too many times in the competitive technology industry.
These events are a way of life, they happen all the time. The unwritten rule of thumb is “Just play thru the pain like pro athletes” do. But in my reality the tech industry is “burnout central”. I see it too often. We forget that Pro Athletes don’t play everyday and the ones who have long careers take care of themselves very well.
Anedotal Evidence ( tech is a high risk environment ) — I know a handful of burnout victims whose symptoms were so serious that they had to make significant career changes. Most of them were marketers, none were VP and above. Not a large number, but depending on how I count, this is anywhere from 20 to 50% of some job categories. Note that these percentages include only the ones who have confided in me. Few people like to advertise that they can’t cut it anymore.
It is interesting that most statistics that I’ve read talk about this executive (VP+) dividing line as well. The most common explanation is that executives spend a lot more time reviewing the the “pros & cons” of projects, they have a lot more information, they are usually the first to “buy in” to programs, they are on the hook to “sell the program” downstream, and generally have more control of their environment. This does make some sense, but I’m still not sure about this explanation.
Being a “poster child” for burn-out has also put me in a position to constantly hear anecdotal comments from friends and colleagues all over the industry. I hear the following phrase too often, “there is sooo much of what you have in the valley”. These numbers are the same everywhere. I’m guessing that every tech worker has had a few scares along the way.
It’s Not Gonna Happen to Me ( wrong ) — I’m not saying that everyone should go out an quit their job now. I’m saying that you’ve got to be aware that you work in a high risk environment. You’ve got look at the example of Pro Athletes — take care of yourself if you want a long career. If you start having symptoms act on them quickly. Don’t let them slide. Better yet — be proactive.
It’s good to know how you react to stress, so that you can act on it. This is difficult, not everyone reacts to stress in the same way. Some people develop more physical ailments like rashes, back pain, numbness, etc. Another indicator is how you make decisions. Most managers take a test to see how they make decisions under stress. I forget the name, but its the one where the results are plotted on “triangle graph” – blue in top left, red in top right, and green on the bottom. You mark the point where you are with little stress and the point where you are under lots of stress. The “vector” then describes you under stress.
If you have a “long vector” it is relatively simple for you, and others, to determine when you’re are under stress. Unfortunately for me I am one of those people whose dots sit on top of one another — The Hub guy — I’m an ice man — no difference between stress and no stress. The good news — I play great under pressure — the bad news — this group is the most susceptible to burnout.
It’s Ok … Burn Out doesn’t last forever ( wrong ) — Unlike a cut or a broken bone, burnout often doesn’t heal well. It usually leaves a permanent “scar”. In my case I have effects that are analogous to a person who has had multiple concussions. My “concussions” are brought on by a combination of stress and situations which require me to follow multiple “threads” of conversation/thinking. In computer lingo I don’t “task switch” well ( if at all ). If I get myself into a situation where “task switching” is key — like a meeting or party I’ll slowly begin having difficulty following the conversation. If I stick with it I’ll soon begin having “concussion” like symptoms — starts with ringing in the head & can get as severe as near blackout.
In daily life this is confusing for most people I interact with because I look normal. In fact most people note — you look great. This is likely to be true since I’m down to university level clothing sizes. But just like a “Lindros or Lafontaine”, whose pro hockey careers ended due to concussions, I look like I can play. I want to play. But if I do play, I’m putting my long term health in jeopardy every time that I step on the playing surface
I have effects every meeting ( social or work ) that I attend. It never goes away.
Movin On – I put the Daedalus and Icarus picture above because it describes how I feel when I’m working with others these days. I have plenty of experience which can help people to fly. But this knowledge also allows them to fly too close to the sun. Just like I did